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A ‘young professional’ in the public service in 1912 had 
good cause for optimism. The Public Service Act 1912, 
which enacted most of the recommendations of the Hunt 
Royal Commission, had created a merit-based system with 
standardised conditions of employment, pay and pensions, 
and hiring, firing and promotion decided by the public 
service commissioner. That gave security and independence. 
There were yearly pay rises for new entrants (cadets); a 
capable officer could earn a respectable sum by his thirties 
(this was an overwhelmingly male service); there was annual 
leave and ‘liberal sick leave on pay’ and the opportunity 
to earn professional qualifications (Public Service 
Commissioner, 1920, p.6).
Moreover, this was in service of a 
government in a young dominion whose 
public believed in ‘progress’, based on 
turning forest into farms and selling the 
products to Britain, secure in the arms of 
the greatest empire of all time – and better 
fed and enjoying better living conditions 
than Britain itself. New Zealand was one 
of that era’s ‘emerging economies’; that is, 
it was on an upward path. It had recently 
pioneered some social policy innovations. 
A young professional could be part of that 
expansion and uplift, engaged in making 
a ‘Greater Britain’, or at least a ‘Better 
Britain’ (Belich, 1996, p.449).
Three years later that comfortable 
certainty began to disintegrate, and 20 
years later optimism was in short supply. 
Gallipoli in 1915 and the murder on the 
western front in servitude of British 
generals, recession and then uneven 
economic times in the 1920s, and, 
after 1929, the United States-generated 
world economic depression damaged 
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communities and undermined morale 
and belief in that ‘Better Britain’. Cabinets 
were humdrum, hidebound and, by 
1932, bemused and bewildered. In the 
early 1930s public servants’ pay was cut, 
unemployed numbers blew out, farmers 
walked off farms and there seemed no 
rescue. The government, loyally served by 
its staff and slave to the myopic economic 
and fiscal wisdom of the times, seemed, 
and even presented itself as, powerless. 
There was an exception in the public 
service: W.B. Sutch had different ideas. 
In the Cabinet, Gordon Coates tried to 
think outside the iron box of orthodoxy. 
And waiting on the opposition benches 
was a party with an ideological belief in 
the power of the state which by 1935 had 
toned down its revolutionary socialism 
into a sort of practical decency – ‘applied 
Christianity’, one of its leaders called it 
(Sinclair, 1976, p.20).1
Thus, from 1936 there was cause again 
for optimism among young professionals 
in the public service. They were to build 
the Labour Party’s fair society, with 
opportunity for all: that is, to midwife 
the birth of the welfare state and the 
mixed economy which had at its core 
the guaranteed job. By the late 1940s the 
new orthodoxy was embedded to the 
extent that two decades of conservative 
government after 1949 reversed little and 
even expanded some of its activities. 
The state at that time took a quarter 
of the economy in taxes and was 
threaded through society. Public servants 
were not a marginal necessity; that is, 
needed to manage the state’s monopoly 
of force, provide a basic education and 
alleviate the worst distresses and raise 
the necessary funds to do that. Public 
servants were integral to economic and 
social life. Among those who joined, or 
rejoined, the public service in the late 
1940s were some of the best minds in 
the country, who 20 years later were at 
least as important as, and arguably more 
important than, the leading businessmen. 
And they had a bundle of new theories 
on which to base policy prescriptions: 
John Maynard Keynes pre-eminently, but 
also in the 1950s and 1960s John Kenneth 
Galbraith, plus a host of political theorists 
and political sociologists, including C. 
Wright Mills and Seymour Martin Lipset, 
and, at home, an American who started 
Victoria University’s politics department 
in 1939, Leslie Lipson (Lipson, 2011). 
When a royal commission reviewed the 
public service in 1962, 50 years on from 
1912, the changes were modest. 
Professor Keith Jackson could 
plausibly describe the country at that 
time as social democratic, and include 
the National Party. ‘Planning’ was still 
respectable: in 1968-69 the National 
Party, in government, convened an 
‘indicative planning’ conference which 
ran for most of a year and set targets for 
sectors and recommended policy changes 
to achieve them. A conservative judge 
chaired a royal commission which in 
1967 recommended socialising workplace 
accident insurance and compensation. 
Another conservative judge chaired a 
royal commission which in 1972 said the 
aim of the social security system should 
be to ‘ensure … that everyone is able to 
enjoy a standard of living much like that 
of the rest of the community and thus is 
able to feel a sense of participation and 
belonging to the community’ and to 
‘improve by other means and as far as 
possible the quality of life’, and so ‘the 
objectives of the social security system 
may quite properly be expanded to cover 
a much wider field of public welfare 
than hitherto’ (Royal Commission on 
Social Security, 1972, pp.65-6). The 
incoming Labour government of 1972 
was armed with a book-length manifesto 
of social programmes which it set out to 
implement, secure (it thought) behind 
import and foreign exchange controls. 
This was social democracy at its 
apogee. There was an implicit assumption 
that if politicians and public servants tried 
hard enough, they could, through the 
instruments of the state, perfect society. 
Full citizenship was the state’s duty and 
purpose. 
To underline this ambition, the 
language was changed. The economic 
notion of ‘welfare’ was adopted into the 
social intervention vocabulary. ‘Security’ 
was no longer enough, as it had been in 
1938. Henceforth, every citizen’s ‘welfare’ 
was the state’s responsibility (as well as the 
individual’s and the family’s). This large 
ambition was the intellectual milieu in 
which future prime minister Helen Clark 
imbibed her social democracy. Over the 
next decade the government expanded its 
taxation from a quarter of the economy 
to more than a third. 
In fact, by the early 1970s, as Helen Clark 
was in transition from rural Presbyterian 
conservatism to social democratic and 
peace idealism, the intellectual tide 
was turning. No sooner had Daniel 
Bell asserted ‘the end of ideology’ (Bell, 
1960), in a book written as even United 
States Republicans settled into the mixed 
economy and social security, than Milton 
Friedman reasserted in 1962 the central 
economic role of markets and posited the 
control of money supply as governments’ 
primary economic management role 
(Friedman, 1962). In this thinking, 
the state – and public servants – had 
many shortcomings, which were later 
explored in theories of agency, contract 
and moral hazard (public servants 
were said to develop vested interests in 
their programmes, counter to citizens’ 
advantage). Essentially, these analyses 
argued that those running governments 
(public services), however well trained 
and well-meaning and however much 
acting on available evidence, often got it 
wrong. It was better that citizens got on 
with their lives with minimal, or at least 
less, intervention from governments. 
This intellectual scepticism was 
magnified by a disjunctive event, the 
‘Security’ was no longer enough, as it had been in 
1938. Henceforth, every citizen’s ‘welfare’ was the 
state’s responsibility (as well as the individual’s 
and the family’s).
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1973 oil crisis, which triggered the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
of fixed exchange rates and pushed 
developed economies into ‘stagflation’, a 
combination of low GDP growth, high 
inflation and high unemployment which 
Keynesian analysis could not readily 
explain, and which defied (and defiled) 
that celebrated New Zealand invention, 
the Phillips curve.2 That undermined the 
core assumptions of the mixed economy 
and the presumption that governments 
could, through intelligent planning and 
intervention, be wise guardians of the 
public interest and economic welfare. The 
alternative, ‘neo-liberal’ or ‘neoclassical’, 
proposition, as it came to be labelled, 
assumed that optimum societal outcomes 
would emerge spontaneously from the 
interaction of autonomous citizens, 
and that optimum economic outcomes 
would emerge from the interaction of 
those autonomous individuals in markets 
which tended always to equilibrium. 
Governments’ role was to set the rules, 
and those rules should be light-handed 
so as not to impede markets’ efficiency. 
In the late 1970s that market ideology 
took hold in governments in our sorts of 
countries, first in the late 1970s in United 
States, then in Britain, and in the early–
mid-1980s in Australia and New Zealand. 
This precipitated the second great post-
1912 reorientation for public servants. 
Markets were held to be much better at 
allocating resources than governments, so 
regulation of markets should be greatly 
reduced and their moderation should 
rely much more on information and the 
automatic self-regulation of competition. 
New Zealand markets should join global 
markets through de-protection of imports 
and removal of tax and other subsidies. 
Budgets should be balanced and the 
government should be smaller. 
The government was accordingly re-
engineered to look and operate more 
like a set of businesses: the ‘commercial’ 
departments were made into business 
corporations, and the ‘core’ public 
service agencies were instructed to 
focus on ‘clients’ and given specific 
mandates, which required the break-up 
of many agencies, to separate policy from 
operations and regulation. The agencies 
were headed by plenipotentiary ‘chief 
executives’, on fixed terms and written 
contracts with ministers to deliver 
‘outputs’ for a price and thereby to pursue 
‘outcomes’, also agreed with ministers, 
with, later, strategic result areas and key 
result areas spelt out. They, and so also 
their staffs, were accountable to the board 
– that is, the Cabinet – and through the 
Cabinet to the shareholders – that is, the 
public. The prescriptive public service 
rule book – which went into marvellous 
detail, such as how to park cars on hills 
– was replaced by edicts from the chief 
executive’s office. 
This resulted in big efficiency and 
effectiveness gains, which were of 
great value to the government and to 
the public. But there were also some 
wasteful inefficiencies and the loss of 
much institutional knowledge. Cut-down 
policy ministries lacked direct experience 
of what they were making policy for; 
operational agencies developed their own 
policy sections; agencies retreated into 
‘silos’, jealous of their jurisdictions. 
At the same time, ministers began 
acquiring bigger staffs, which included 
professional communicators, political 
advisers and policy advisers who were not 
from the public service. There had always 
been competition for ministers’ ears on 
policy matters, principally from interest 
groups; in the 1960s the government 
often looked like an arbitrator among 
the interest groups, some of which were 
also in a sense ‘represented’ in the public 
service by particular departments such as 
agriculture and industries and commerce. 
But after the 1980s reforms interest 
groups could no longer expect a hearing 
from ministers for special pleading; they 
had to make a national-interest case. 
Government agencies, too, were expected 
not to act as advocates for their sectors 
but to devise policy on national-interest 
grounds. That opened space for the new 
breed of professional ministerial adviser. 
The 1980s reforms took time to 
shake down. The reformers had assumed 
function would automatically follow 
form but it did not work out like that. 
The separately managed entities were 
supposed to achieve lofty ‘outcomes’, 
many of which required cross-agency 
cooperation, which fragmentation made 
difficult or near-impossible. This was no 
surprise: public services can’t be left to 
the ‘market’ to sort out because for the 
non-commercial activities there isn’t one, 
and the objectives are far more complex 
than simple figures in a quarterly profit-
and-loss account or annual balance sheet. 
A round table at the Institute of Policy 
Studies in the late 1990s encountered 
that non-transferability when it fished 
unsuccessfully for a public service 
formula to match Schumpeter’s ‘creative 
destruction’, a core element of successful 
market capitalism.3
In other words, there was unfinished 
business. The system was unstable, as 
evidenced in a flow of inquiries, reports, 
reviews, reorganisations and even acts of 
Parliament; and now the public service in 
another period of deep change, the third 
since 1912. 
That is in part because the operating 
environment has changed. The world is 
in rapid and deep change, crystallised in 
the global financial crisis – the GFC. This, 
like the 1914 war, the 1929 stockmarket 
crash and subsequent world depression, 
and the 1973 oil crisis, is a disjunctive 
event. These occur from time to time 
because human society is, to quote 
historian Niall Ferguson, a complex 
adaptive organism and such organisms 
are inherently unstable: a seemingly 
The separately managed entities were  
supposed to achieve lofty ‘outcomes’, many  
of which required cross-agency cooperation, 
which fragmentation made difficult or near-
impossible. 
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unexceptional event (like the shooting 
of an Austrian duke) can trigger sudden 
chaotic change, the timing, nature and 
course of which cannot be predicted in 
advance. Financial systems, which operate 
on debt, are such organisms.4 Hence the 
GFC, which is just the latest in a long 
line of sudden, destructive convulsions in 
financial markets. 
The first thing to say about the global 
financial crisis and about the certainty 
that there will be more such convulsions 
in the next 50 years is that disjunctive 
events are not a reason for public 
servants and politicians to retreat into 
fatalistic incapacity. That would not be 
serving the public. What the public needs 
from its servants is resilience, a capacity 
to anticipate that there will be such 
events, the better to respond when they 
happen even if their form and timing 
cannot be predicted.5 Top firms do that 
sort of contingency planning, along with 
projecting forward business as usual. So 
do top governments: Singapore is one. 
New Zealand is not one: witness its blithe 
indulgence of the 1990-2007 debt binge 
and dismissal of the warning signs of 
stellar balance of payments deficits, an 
even more stellar country debt and a yet 
more stellar house price bubble. 
The second thing to say about the 
GFC is that it is indicative of much wider 
and deeper change. 
One element of that change is that 
it has accelerated the global economic 
and political rebalancing that ends the 
west’s 500-year ascendancy in economic 
power, global security and ideas, both 
in science and technology and for social, 
political and economic organisation. 
Not least, the developed economies will 
likely need up to 20 years to amortise 
their debt. And there will be tensions 
during the rebalancing, exacerbated by 
periodic shortages of, and competition 
for, resources, especially water, which may 
involve serious intrastate civil disorder 
and interstate military conflict which 
itself is likely to take new forms. Climate 
change is potentially another contributor 
to disorder. 
A second element is the economic 
opportunity for New Zealand in the rapid 
global urbanisation, which is adding large 
numbers to the global middle classes who 
want safe high-protein foods. 
A third element, which links the 
first two, is what some commentators 
are calling hyperglobalisation, a new 
and intense phase of globalisation of 
supply chains and a ‘global commons’ of 
work. This circumscribes the scope for 
independent national sovereign policy 
for big countries as well as small ones. 
A fourth element, which enables and 
in part drives the third, is an intensifying 
interconnection of individuals and 
societies through digital technology. 
Developments in the past five years alone 
have been astonishing and much more is 
to come. 
Outgrowths of this fourth element 
are, fifth, new technologies which seem 
set to radically change and relocate 
manufacturing, conceivably (though 
not necessarily) offering opportunities 
for even small countries; and which, 
on the dark side, are likely to enable 
cyberterrorism and cyberwarfare, posing 
serious security issues. And sixth, 
the intertwining of nanotechnology, 
biotechnology and genetics promises 
striking advances in therapeutics. Major 
advances in energy technology are also 
highly likely. 
Within New Zealand the population 
will continue to ‘Polynesianise’, Asianise 
and age, and the economy and society 
will continue to Australasianise, even if 
the political systems and foreign policies 
remain distinct. The abundance of water 
and energy, the relatively light effect of 
climate change, the distance from global 
mayhem, coupled with strong political 
and legal institutions, the good education 
system and an adaptive, inventive and 
tolerant population and high ranking 
in broader measures of prosperity, may 
make this country a highly desirable place 
to outsiders for investment and domicile. 
My point in traversing this brief and 
highly selective list is that, as in 1912, in 
this year, 2012, there is good cause for 
young professionals in the public service 
to be optimistic. We are in an interesting, 
intriguing, scary and energising patch 
of change, at least as big as those that 
followed 1912: the worst of times and the 
best of times. For those public servants 
with wit and resilience this could be as 
good as it gets. It could also be the time 
when a great deal goes bad. 
And there is an irony in which resides 
a challenge. 
Neo-liberalism instructed govern-
ments to get smaller. Globalisation tells 
states their sovereignty is limited, and 
geo-economic rebalancing tells New 
Zealand its future comparator countries 
– those in Asia – will have smaller social 
assistance and ‘fairness’ adjusters – even 
when they are much richer – than our 
old comparator, north Atlantic, countries. 
But the rise of generation Y tells us 
that services, including education and 
health services, must be easily accessible 
and customised. Moreover, to ensure 
continuing prosperity, countries will 
need somehow to ensure that children 
are educable and to educate them, which 
implies a more active and even intrusive 
state (in very early childhood) – certainly 
a more ambitious one. 
Thus it is an irony of the neo-
liberal interlude that governments 
became more, not less, ambitious. In 
the late 1990s, Jenny Shipley, having 
proclaimed herself a ‘radical conservative’, 
declared an ambition to ‘break the 
Globalisation tells states their sovereignty is 
limited, and geo-economic rebalancing tells New 
Zealand its future comparator countries – those 
in Asia – will have smaller social assistance and 
‘fairness’ adjusters ... than our old comparator, 
north Atlantic, countries. 
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cycle of disadvantage’. The early 1970s 
assumption that if governments tried 
hard enough society could be perfected 
was discarded – but has been replaced 
by a 2010s assumption that the quest for 
the prosperity promised in the globalised 
economy requires a degree of policy 
inventiveness and sophistication, based 
on science and rigorous analysis and 
tested by tough assessment, that 1970s 
public servants and politicians would have 
boggled at. Examples might be to think 
of a cohesive society as infrastructure, 
to be invested in and maintained, if the 
scourge of inequality is to be deracinated, 
and thinking of ecosystems as 
infrastructure if both material aspirations 
and environmental needs are to be met 
(James, 2011). This prosperous society of 
the 2010s requires experimentation and 
risk-taking, uncommon attributes and 
activities in politics and administration 
which value entrepreneurialism more in 
the abstract than in reality. It requires new 
organisational forms, and cooperation 
and partnerships that conflate public and 
private. 
Governing now is far more complex 
than 40 or even 25 years ago. And it 
must be done in the glare of instant 
blogging and news-entertainment, and 
with far more accountability through 
official information channels and the 
ombudsman and in a suspicious and 
active legal system. This, in short, is the 
‘better public services’ era – except that 
the report that goes by that name is a 
tentative sketch, not a blueprint. Riding 
these waves of change will require 
constant and rapid adaptation by citizens. 
To devise and manage the corresponding 
policy settings will require super-smart, 
agile brains and daring personalities in 
the public service. That is you. In 2012 a 
‘young professional’ has good cause for 
optimism. Have fun. 
1 Sinclair comments, ‘To [Walter] Nash, socialism was quite 
literally applied Christianity’.  
2 Bill Phillips, a New Zealand economist, famously (or 
notoriously) demonstrated in 1958 an empirical inverse 
relationship between inflation and unemployment. For 
a discussion in a New Zealand context, see http://www.
reservebank.govt.nz/research/bulletin/2002_2006/2006sep6
9_3hargreaveskitehodgetts.pdf.
3 Informal thematic summary prepared by writer, distributed 
only to participants.
4 It is possible to discern in advance imbalances and 
elements of instability, as, for example, a small minority did 
in expecting a longish conflict in 1914, or another small 
minority did in noting in the early-mid-2000s the massive 
rise in debt in developed economies and the resultant 
geo-economic imbalances. But those who expected a longer 
war in 1914 than the populist ‘home by Christmas’ line did 
not predict the catastrophe that unfolded or the changed 
geopolitical world at its end. Nor did those worrying about 
the pre-2007 imbalances predict the course of the GFC and 
the likely 10–20-year rebalancing which has yet, in effect, to 
start.
5 For one take on this see James (2012), and in paper to be 
published as part of the Treasury’s 40–year fiscal projections 
in November 2012.
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